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I 
Labor - Free or Coerced? A Historical Reassessment 
·of Differences and Similarities 

Robert]. Steinfeld and Stanley L. Engerman* 

Over the last twenty years, historians have developed a more complicated picture 
of the forms of labor in use in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Wh re 
previously they tended to divide labor simply into free wage labor on one side, 
and slave or serf labor on the other, this new view has added contract labor, 
indentured servitude, apprenticeship, and peonage to the map of fonns of labor 
in use in earlier centuries. 1 But the new map continues to classify these different 
fonns of labor as coming under the basic categories free or unfree, and continues 
to assume that each of these forms of labor is a distinctive "type" which is 
supposed to have a natural core set of characteristics that sets it off from the 
others, and marks it definitively as either "free" or "unfree". The modem 
conceptual map of labor looks something like the following: 
Free labor: Wage labor 
Unfree labor: Apprenticeship, indentured servitude, contract labor, peonage, 
serfdom, slavery 
This paper will argue that the above picture and the assumptions upon which 
it rests still need to be radically revised to capture the reality of labor relations 
in the past and perhaps also the present. First, it will argue that "types" of labor, 
like "wage labor" and "contract labor", never did possess a set of fixed, natural 
characteristics, but were defined by a range of characteristics and that depending 
upon the precise characteristics they possessed-in any particular place, such labor 
might be considered either "free" or "unfree". By the standards of twentieth­
century American constitutional law,2 for example, nineteenth-century English 
wage labor" was "unfree" labor, while nineteenth-century American "contract 
* 	 For comments in the preparation of this paper we wish to thank Seymour Drescher, David 
Eltis, Lou Ferleger, David Galenson, Sherwin Rosen, and the participants at the conference, 
particularly Pieter Emmer and Ralph Shlomowitz. 
1. 	 A number of the ideas presented in this paper have been developed more fully elsewhere. 
See Steinfeld, "Myth of the Rise of Free Labor", Invention of Free Labor; see Engerman, 
"Coerced and Free Labor", "Economics of Forced Labor", and "Land and Labour Problem". 
2. 	 See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), pp. 215-216; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219 (1911), p. 243; Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), p. 18. 
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labor" was "free" labor. As this example makes clear, the different "types" of 
labor were, in certain respects, not nearly as discrete and discontinuous as the 
standard picture implies. At the boundaries the "types" of labor frequently blur 
and merge. Moreover, since labor force characteristics include a number of 
different dimensions (entry, performance, and exit among them), at times not 
all these aspects can be fit into the same side of the free-unfree dichotomy. 
We shall argue that the classification of labor into "free" or "unfree" is an 
arbitrary not a natural classification. All "dependent" labor is elicited as the result 
of pressures brought to bear on it, pressures that are socially and legally con­
structed. Since variations exist in the economic, legal, political, and social aspects 
of these constructions, the spectrum of labor systems does not imply any 
equivalence in effects upon workers or hirers, and such differences remain a 
source of debate and struggle. Nevertheless, to call some labor elicited under 
certain pressures "voluntary" and other labor elicited under different kinds of 
pressures "involuntary" represents arbitrary line drawing that obscures the 
coercive content of some labor regimes, and ignores the important role of the 
legal system and laws in land and labor (including immigration) policy. 
Further, we will suggest that a better way to understand the history of labor 
is in terms of a range of coercive practices utilized in different places and at 
different times, all constructed (but sometimes in different ways) by law, rather 
than by the present construct of discontinuous "types" of labor arranged under 
the headings "free" and "unfree". We will offer a number of examples of the 
ways in which different regimes can be made to achieve similar results. Finally, 
we will suggest that historians of labor should focus on a more particularistic 
set of inquiries about the particular practices that different societies and polities 
permitted and prohibited, the reasons for those decisions, and thus the nature 
and the outcome of the different varieties of what can be generally regarded as 
forms of labor coercion. 
Part of the difficulty involved in the attempt to separate free from unfree labor 
arises from the fact that there are several different aspects to the package of labor 
inputs that need to be considered. The absence of legal or physical coercion in 
one dimension need not preclude such coercion in another. Various different 
forms of control may be used in the different dimensions of the labor relation­
ship. Therefore, even when the absence of direct controls and coercion are as 
complete as they are under conditions of "freedom," some coercive elements 
may remain, which makes a definition of free labor problematic. 
To better understand what is meant by various types of free and coerced labor, 
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including slavery and serfdom, it will be useful to trace the steps involved in the 
acquisition and use of labor, and to describe the problems faced by users of labor 
as well as laborers at each step. We can regard the ruling class as desiring to have 
a large supply of labor with low labor costs, where and when it wants it. Low 
labor costs need not necessarily mean low wages or other payments to laborers, 
since productivity must be considered, and expensive labor with large amounts 
of human capital may be preferred to cheap labor with only limited skills. 
Among free populations, labor force participation is influenced by the desire 
to consume. This desire could be due to the basic need to acquire a minimal, 
physically necessary, amount of goods, although in general people desire to 
acquire, for whatever reason, amounts above what is physically necessary. 
" 
Traditionally, among mercantilists and other believers in the "backward bending 
supply curve of labor," it had been argued that for an increased labor force 
participation poverty and low living standards were needed - otherwise most 
people would see no need to work.3 The advantage of free labor, it was often 
argued, came not only from the incentives it provided by letting workers benefit 
from increased outputs, but also from the effectiveness of starvation as an 
inducement to work. It is, of course, possible to maintain aspects of this 
argument even today, as some do, using changing definitions of poverty and 
of what a necessary standard of living is. This relation among free labor, low 
incomes, and labor force participation is a reminder that income levels do not 
always track the legal status of workers or the nature of the distribution of power 
within society. Thus, it has been argued that, in the past, slaves had higher 
incomes than did free farmers or free wage laborers, and this persisted through­
out most of the nineteenth century. Even under slavery, laborers may have been 
able to influence the determination of some part of their labor income and effort, 
as when slaves worked under the task system or other similar systems which 
allowed them to allocate some labor time, although, as with serfs, less working 
time for owners sometimes meant more working time overall to achieve desired 
consumption levels. 4 
Clearly, subsistence income levels were not determined exclusively by nature, 
since they incorporate much in the way of social conventions and of individual 
desires above the physiologically required minimum. At various times, where 
labor was nominally free, attempts were made, by introducing taxation, limiting 
the land to be settled, increasing immigration, and other similar devices influenc­
ing labor incomes and land availability, to lower incomes and change the amount 
3. 	 For discussions of this in the case of the British Industrial Revolution, see Coats, "Changing 
Attitudes to Labour"; and Mathias, Transformation if England, pp. 131-167. See also De Vries, 
"Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution". 
4. 	 For recent discussions of slave influence on working arrangements and consumption patterns, 
see the essays in HudsonJr, Working Toward Freedom. 
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and/or nature of the work free workers were "willing" to do.5 Such consider­
ations, for example, were central to the long-standing debate over the British 
Poor Laws, where the standard, and long-standing, objection to any subsidy for 
even the temporarily "deserving unemployed" was that workers should be 
maintained at poverty levels and could not be permitted to receive unnecessary 
subsidies from other members of society, particularly if labor could be obtained 
from those physically able to work. 
The steps required to get labor to work when and where it is wanted include 
the processes of migration to place of work, getting labor into the particular 
work site, giving them incentives to be productive once on the job, and 
preventing workers from voluntarily leaving the job or region in which their 
labor is needed Long-distance, intercontinental, migration to a new place of 
work, has been accomplished (1) by free migrations (when incomes reached an 
adequate level and incentives to move were there, as when industrialization over 
time in different parts of Europe forced people off the land), (2) by "voluntary" 
indentured servitude, where the initial contract (presumably but debatably 
entered into by voluntary choice) to pay for transport required a certain period 
of controlled labor and included the possibility of sale, and (3) by slavery, with 
the sale of labor on one continent for movement to another. In terms of the 
setdement of the New World prior to 1820, it was slavery that was most 
important, although the numbers were not as large as were to be the free 
migrations from Europe in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 6 
In increasing numbers over time, however, there was a return flow of European 
migrants to their original homes, so that some aspects of the labor adjustment 
were more "temporary" than permanent, a situation quite different from that 
of slaves. These movements could be either for attachment to a specific employer 
in an area, or to provide a large pool of laborers in a particular area on which 
employers could then draw. 
A type of geographic relocation historically more important for serfs, ex-serfs, 
and free workers than for slaves, arose with the expansion of industrial work 
in urban areas. Given the prior predominance of rural populations, some 
movement was necessary to permit modem development, a movement that led 
to some higher incomes but also to some dramatic changes in living and working 
conditions. Migration to urban areas could be either permanent or seasonal, with 
5. 	 "By creating conditions which restricted the alternatives available, increased labor input as 
well as changes in the composition of output were achieved. At the limit, the Malthusian 
subsistence level would determine the minimum necessary labor input, but it was possible 
to obtain similar results by artificial methods of social and political control. While individuals 
maintained legal property rights in themselves, controls over land and capital led to economic 
outcomes resembling those when property rights in persons belonged to others." Engennan, 
"Coerced and Free Labor", p.l8. 
6. See Eltis, "Free and Coerced Transatlantic Migrations". 
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quite different effects on family patterns, cultural continuities, and work habits. 
Even when a sufficient population was available in a given area, problems 
could remain in getting people into the productive labor force or getting people 
to work at a desired work site, be it farm or factory. To accomplish this the 
ruling classes relied upon poverty, while individual employers could use positive 
incentives such as higher wages, shorter hours or better working conditions, or 
certain forms of legal or physical coercion involving specific controls or compul­
sions for particular work. Thus serfdom, which generally drew its labor force 
from people already resident, utilized the legal power of the lord to make serfs 
work for the lord's benefit, most frequently in agricultural pursuits, but, at times, 
also in industrial or service enterprises.7 Similarly, there were controls introdtJced 
by the Spanish settlers over native-Americans that had different characteristics 
than African slavery, and did not involve long-distance involuntary movement 
of the Indians. After a brief period of slavery, the systems of encomienda and 
repartimiento, and then debt peonage, were used to compel working time on the 
estates of the Iberian estate owners. In addition, Indians were often required to 
make payments in the form of tribute to the government and/ or to private 
landowners.8 The coercion under serfdom and in the Spanish-American systems 
was intended to force work of a particular kind at a specific location, but the 
fact that these were already populated areas meant that the long-distance 
involuntary migration characteristic of modern slavery was not necessary. 
Once in the workplace, high levels of worker output were not guaranteed, 
and incentives were needed to induce the desired amount of production. Some 
incentives, to the free workers or those coerced into the workplace, are regarded 
as positive (higher wages, including the use of piece wages; good working 
conditions, etc.), some as negative (fear of firing; physical punishments; removal 
of benefits; fines, etc.). The mix (since several different methods could be used 
together) could vary over time with the nature of legal institutions, and the kinds 
of incentives they intended to permit. Users of labor were frequently concerned 
with the morale of the labor force and its effect on output levels, whatever the 
legal status of labor. The most widely-cited argument on comparative incentives 
was Adam Smith's remark that slave labor would be less productive than free 
because of the lack of incentives for slave workers.9 While this reflected the legal 
basis of the system, which did not require the payment of wages or the provision 
of other positive incentives, the point was also well-known to slave-owners, who 
frequently sought methods to provide incentives to their slaves to increase 
production, once they were on the plantation. At times the physical, psychologi­
7. On late serfdom, see Blum, End of the Old Order. 
8. 	 On the Spanish-American labor systems, see Burkholder and Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 
pp. 108-116; and Lockhart and Schwartz, Early Latin America, pp. 86-146. 
9. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 684. 
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cal, and material treatment of slaves and serfS was not as extreme as the law would 
permit, because of the desire to obtain high outputs from the workers.1° Further, 
the need to direct and coordinate labor when working is a central concern of 
entrepreneurs, which requires the worker to forego certain rights during the 
contracted period. It has been argued, therefore, that during the work period 
itself the various forms of labor institutions approximate each other.11 Clearly, 
the patterns of controls and punishments in the workplace would differ depend­
ing upon the legal status of labor, particularly the freedom to move from one job 
to another, as well as the specific nature of the job. This latter point could explain 
the different incentives and treatment of military in contrast to civilian labor. 
An important concern of so-called free labor was the right to leave employ­
ment whenever and as soon as desired. There were some limitations on this 
agreed to under the terms of voluntarily accepted contracts, and there is a long 
history of court cases regarding specific performance, the need for reimburse­
ment, and the measurement of loss due to premature quitting. An important 
example of exit restrictions has been the British Master and Servants Acts, which 
were carried into most of the British colonies in the nineteenth century.12 These 
made the leaving of a job by "free workers" before the expiration of the agreed­
upon time period a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment. Similar 
examples of restrictions on quitting can be seen in what some regard as critical 
industries even in the twentieth century; for example, a British worker who left 
a munitions factory without permission in W odd War I would be forced to 
suffer six weeks of unemployrnent.13 Similar legal provisions existed in other 
countries, particularly in the earlier stages of industrialization. In mid-nineteenth 
century Russia a "free" worker who left a factory without authorization was 
regarded as a criminal, basically similar to the status of a serf who had run away 
from the estate. 14 Thus even when there was freedom in hiring and in labor 
mobility, the ability to quit when desired, without criminal penalties, was not 
always available to workers. 
10. 	 See Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, pp. 107-157; and the ensuing dicussion of slave 
material living standards. 
11. 	 For an early argument to this effect, see Cicero, De Officis/On Duties, pp. 68-69: "Similarly, 
the work of all hired men who sell their labor and not their talents is servile and contemptible. 
The reason is that in their case wages actually constitute a payment for slavery." An even earlier 
observation to this effect is to be found in Weber's description of Babylonian law regarding 
free hired labor- in Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, p. 96 - "the period of work was 
regarded as temporary slavery". 
12. 	 In addition to the writings of Steinfeld, see also Craven and Hay, "Crirninalization of'Free' 
Labour". 
13. 	 See Wolfe, Labor Supply and Regulation, particularly pp. 217-234. 
14. 	 See Zelnik, Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia, pp. 21-43. 
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Finally, there were questions concerning the ability of even free workers to 
move to new locations in seeking new jobs, since such actions were sometimes 
restricted, used to increase the labor pool in an existing area. In the case of 
serfdom, labor was legally prevented from departing without the lord's permis­
sion, while the same was true under slavery. The slaveowner, however, was free 
to sell the slave to another person who would then control the slave's location. 
Neither slave nor serf was free to move of their own volition. With free labor, 
however, there were restrictions on mobility enforced in many different 
societies, and under several different arrangements. Land for sale and settlement 
was often restricted in countries of relatively low population density such as 
Australia and the United States, thus limiting the numbers of potential n w 
settlers who might take up land and avoid wage work, providing benefits to 
landowners and capitalists in older, more settled areas. Similar effects restricting 
mobility can result from private contracts which include provisions serving to 
raise the costs of departure decisions. Frequently, after the ending of slavery, ex­
slaves would be given small plots of land for themselves if they were willing to 
work for their landlords, thus presumably increasing labor availability and 
reducing its costs. Limitations on the incomes and nationality or ethnicity of 
potential immigrants and of settlers on land have existed, favoring dominant 
groups. Immigration laws, by influencing overall rates of settlement, have had 
a marked impact on returns to labor and labor supplied, even if they have not 
themselves had a direct, legislated effect on the incomes and locational patterns 
of workers. Given the frequent pattern of migrants settling disproportionately 
in urban areas, however, significant effects on wages and the level and structure 
of output resulted. We can also note that the British aid to the unemployed 
(poor relief) was initially intended to keep people in their original place by not 
letting them receive benefits if they moved elsewhere. Any such movement was 
also discouraged by the imposition of residence requirements to prevent aid 
payments in areas of in-migration.15 By these measures the labor pool in the 
former area was increased, while the potential area of in-migration saved on 
benefit payments, albeit with a lowered labor supply available. 
The discussion in the previous section was intended to point to several problems 
in maintaining the rigid distinction between free and coerced labor. First, 
coercion may not exist at each step of the labor acquisition and use process, but 
only at one or two of the stages. Thus the specific forms that coercion takes will 
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differ, and what is regarded as coercion can vary over time and place. Second, 
the various indicators may not all go in the same direction. In particular, the 
distinction between the legal nature of the coercion and the relative material 
benefits to the coerced has long been observed. Poverty may be considered as 
one form of coercion of those legally free, but what some regard as poverty 
might have been the result of choices made voluntarily, though within a 
framework of constraints established by numerous factors including law. Third, 
it is possible to distinguish between economic coercion and legal coercion. 
Economic coercion results from the operation of the market, influenced by 
individual tastes in the fuce of economic constraints, but also by the legal 
regulations in effect. The market is itself structured by law. Legal coercion results 
from a more direct imposition of legal penalties and police controls. Fourth, in 
our focus on coercion for economic production we have omitted discussion of 
other reasons for coercing populations, such as military purposes, for criminal 
correction, for handling children and others deemed unable to care for them­
selves, as well as for dealing with vagrants and the unemployed who should have 
been capable of caring for themselves. Coercion in the economic sphere may 
be only a limited part of the total of society's coercive pattern. 
The present discussions of forced labor, concentrating on the dichotomy of free 
and slave is a residue of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century attacks on 
slavery.16 Slavery at the time was seen as a unique evil, entailing the buying and 
selling of people and the absolute domination of one person by another. Whether 
from a religious or secular perspective, the radically unequal power and legal 
rights of the two parties were seen as inappropriate for modem times and modem 
societies. Even on grounds of economics slavery was seen as inefficient and 
unproductive and a system incompatible with modem economic development. 
In contrast, non-slave (free) labor was regarded as more productive, with its 
incentives generating more output per worker, as well as more morally accept­
abie, since it ended the legal domination over individuals by other persons. The 
debates over slavery posed a contrast that permitted no intermediate cases or 
complications in personal or leg::>1 status, a presentation useful for that particular 
attempt at reform, but one which has proven to be misleading as applied to the 
broad range of cases. For the legal, political, and economic systems have been 
able to provide constraints, which even if not legally as severe as slavery, serve 
16. 	 On the issues noted in this paragraph see, in particular, Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age 
of Revolution, and Slavery and Human Progress; and Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery. 
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to limit individual choice. While neither ideally "free" (however that might be 
defined) nor as coercive as slavery, these systems do constrain, by intent or 
otherwise, what individuals might do. Neither slave nor free, these hybrids 
contain elements of both. Some are based on initially voluntary agreements that 
constrain behavior for a period up to several years, some result as responses to 
legal or illegal actions undertaken by individuals, and some arose from a desire 
to constrain economic choices of landowners as well as workers on the land, but 
all do serve to limit worker rights and incomes, generally based on the control 
over the labor of individuals, not the full ownership of their bodies. 17 
The conventional dichotomy of free and coerced labor rests on a set of assump­
tions that have been with us for a long time. Labor is supposed to be arranged 
in a menu of "types": wage labor, contract labor, peonage, slavery, serfdom. 
Each "type" is supposed to have a set of fixed characteristics that define it as 
either "free" or "unfree". Wage labor is the principal "type" of free labor. 
Contract labor is one "type" of unfree labor. What separates free labor from 
unfree labor is that unfree labor is subject to physical or legal compulsion while 
free labor is not. 
In this section, we will look more closely at these two "types" of labor in the 
United States and in England to show that nineteenth century wage work was 
sometimes elicited through legal compulsion, and nineteenth-century contract 
labor was sometimes not subject to this kind of pressure. Following the conven­
tional distinction we would have to say that in these cases the wage labor was 
unfree labor while the contract labor was free labor. As noted above, for almost 
a century after the Industrial Revolution, most English wage workers could be 
legally compelled to perform their engagements. 18 If they tried to quit before 
they had completed their term of engagement they could be imprisoned and 
reimprisoned until they returned to work out their time.19 During their period 
of engagement they could be sent to the house of correction for breaches of 
conduct, for disobedience, sloppy work or leaving before the work day had 
ended. The labor 6fEnglish wage workers, in other words, was elicited under 
17. 	 The distinction between owning labor and owning the body of the laborer can be found in 
Blackstone, Commentaries, 2, pp. 401-402, and was later a part of the proslavery defense. 
18. 	 See particularly 6 Geo. III, c.25 (1766), and 4 Geo. IV, c.34 (1823). 
19. 	 The Kingv. The Inhabitants of B arton-Upon Irwell, 2M. & S. 329 (1814); Ex Parte Baker, 
7 El. & Bl. 697 (1857); Unwin v. Clarke, 1 L.R. 417 (1866); Cuder v. Turner, 9 L.R. 502 
(1874). 
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the kinds of threats that under modem American constitutional law make the 
" 0 labor "involuntary servitude. 2
On the other hand, contract laborers imported into the United States begin­
ning in the 1860s could not be legally compelled to perform their agreements, 
even though their employers had paid their transportation expenses. 21 The law 
of Northern states simply didn't authorize criminal punishment for contract 
breaches.22 Needless to say American employers did strive to hold their contract 
workers to their agreements. They incorporated numerous provisions into 
contracts to try to ensure their performance. Sometimes, they had groups of 
workers agree to be held joindy and severally liable for breaches by any member 
of the group. If one absconded before fulfilling her agreement, the remaining 
group members would be liable for the debt.23 Or they would have a propertied 
person from the contract laborer's home town personally guarantee the passage 
debt in case the contract worker ran away.24 Employers used these devices as 
substitutes for criminal punishment to try to force workers to perform their 
agree.ments. 
The conventional picture of labor forms arranged under the categories free and 
unfree has reified labor "types." Neither contract labor nor wage labor were 
"things" with f natural sets of characteristics, one of which was freedom or 
unfreedom. They were social/legal practices which could be constructed in a 
range of different ways. Freedom or unfreedom were coincidental rather than 
essential features of both. The state could decide to give criminal sanctions to 
employers for breach or could decide not to. Moreover, this decision was only 
one of numerous social and legal decisions that went into the construction of 
these practices. A hundred similar decisions determined the f grained coercive 
content of these practices along a continuum, rather than in terms of a single 
yes/no (coerced/free) decision about criminal sanctions. Suppose, for example, 
that courts had refused to enforce contracts in which immigrants agreed to be 
held joindy and severally liable for breach. Judges might have taken this position 
on the ground that these kinds of coercive measures represented unwarranted 
impositions on immigrants. Or suppose the opposite. Suppose employers were 
legally entided to double damages for premature departure, could garnishee future 
wages to collect these damage awards, as well as hold new employers responsible 
ixed, 
ine 
20. 	See Clyatt v. United States, pp. 215-216; Bailey v. Alabama, p. 243; Pollock v. Willi
p. 18. 
21. 	 See in general Erickson, American Industry and the European Immigrant, pp. 1-63. See 
Steinfeld, Invention of Free LAbor, p. 172. 
22. 	 See, for example, Parsons v. Trask and Others, 73 Mass \1 Gray) 473 (1856). 
23. 	 Creamer, "Recruiting Contract Laborers", p. 46. 
24. 	 Ibid., pp. 49, 53. 
ams, 
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for the debt. A range of different possible practices of contract labor and wage 
labor are possible giving employers many different degrees of coercive power. 
An implicit explanatory scheme underlies the contemporary map of labor 
"types" in which each "type" falls on one side or the other of the free/ coerced 
dichotomy. Employers are viewed as facing an established menu of fixed labor 
"types". It is assumed that economic conditions explain why they choose a 
particular "type" in a particular place at a particular time. Unfree labor was used 
where the wage-labor market had not yet been created or where it had broken 
down, where as in the colonial periphery, labor was in short supply and land 
was abundant. Where there was a large population of propertyless laborers and 
where land was expensive, as in the mature metropolitan economies, free wage 
labor was the "natural" form of labor. Under those circumstances, the "dull 
compulsion of economic relations" could be relied upon to supply adequate 
labor at economical wage rates. Legal compulsion was unnecessary. 
But the English and American experiences raise serious questions about this 
explanatory scheme. American employers did resort to contract workers largely 
because the domestic wage labor market had partially broken down. The military 
demands of the Civil War had made skilled labor very difficult to obtain at 
economic wage rates. But it is in such circumstances that employers are supposed 
to tum to unfree labor. Yet American contract labor was free labor. Why? 
American contract workers were free because in the northern states into which 
they were imported the law did not provide criminal sanctions for contract 
breach. The contract rules which limited employers to money damages in 
northern states have to be understood as decisions taken by these polities through 
their legal systems to authorize certain kinds of coercion in labor relations but 
to prohibit others. To explain these kinds of decisions, it is necessary to undertake 
much more particularistic inquiries into local political (including the extent of 
the suffrage), legal, and cultural conditions as much as into local economic ones. 
The contract rules in effect in northern states were the product of a long and 
complex history of conflict. It is enough here to say that the outcome of this 
history was a collective determination reached in those states and later in the 
United States as a whole that slavery was illegitimate and should be prohibited 
and that forms of labor like slavery should be prohibited along with it.25 The 1864 
"Act to Encourage Immigration", under which some contract laborers were 
imported, itself makes clear why criminal sanctions for breach would play no part 
in this legislation. Section 2 of the act declares: "nothing herein contained shall 
be deemed to authorize any contract contravening the Constitution of the United 
States, or creating in any way the relation of slavery or servitude". 26 
25. See Parsons v. Trask. 
26. U.S. Statutes at Large, XIII (1863-1865), pp. 385-387. 
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The same kind of analysis is called for in the case of wage labor, even the wage 
labor of the metropolitan core. Measured by comparative wage rates, American 
labor was in shorter supply than English wage labor throughout most of the 
nineteenth century. The relative abundance of English labor and the high cost 
of English land on one hand, and the relative scarcity of American labor and 
low cost of American land on the other would lead us to expect that if legal 
compulsion were used, it would have been used against American wage workers 
rather than English wage workers. But exactly the opposite turns out to have 
been the case. Where labor was scarcer and land less expensive in the United 
States, wage labor was free. Where labor was more abundant, and land more 
expensive in England, wage labor was unfree. 
What needs explaining in the case of wage labor as in the case of contract labor 
is not the "type" of labor used, but the legal rules that give employers rights to 
certain coercive devices, permit them to use others, but prohibit them from 
using a range of still other possible forms of coercion. And it does not appear 
that these rules can be explained solely by a simple economic formula based on 
the characteristics of local land and labor markets. Any explanation for these rules 
must take into account numerous additional factors, including relative political 
power, the role of the judiciary, social norms, and the bargaining strength of 
labor. 
To this point, we have not directly challenged another previously mentioned 
basic assumption which underlies the contemporary picture of the forms of 
labor: the idea that labor is divided into free and unfree, and that it is natural 
to draw the line between the two at the point at which employers are able to 
compel labor by resorting to physical force or legal compulsion. 
But just as we earlier criticized the soundness of the picture of discrete types 
of labor each with a fixed set of core characteristics, each functionally adapted 
to ,a particular stage or type of social/ economic organization, at this point, we 
have to take a further step. We need to rethink the basic soundness of the binary 
opposition free/unfree labor. The line between voluntary and coerced labor has 
been drawn in different ways in different places at different times. For the most 
part, for example, the nineteenth century English did not consider their wage 
workers unfree. But there is a good reason that this line has been drawn in 
different ways. Nearly all forms of labor not performed for sheer pleasure can 
be characterized in either way. 
When we speak about compulsion in labor relations, it is important to see that 
we are generally talking about situations in which the compelled party is only 
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offered a choice between unpleasant alternatives and chooses the alternative 
which represents the lesser evil to him or her. 27 This kind of compulsion is 
present in both slavery and free wage labor. In slavery, for example, labor is not 
normally elicited by directly imparting motion to a slave's limbs through 
overpowering physical force. It is compelled by forcing slaves to choose among 
very unpleasant options, between, for example, death, dismemberment, torture, 
endless confinement on the one hand, or back breaking physical labor on the 
other. The labor of free wage workers is similarly elicited by offering workers 
a choice, for example, between life on an inadequate welfare stipend established 
by the polity, or in the extreme, starvation, on the one hand, and performing 
more or less unpleasant work for wages for an employer on the other. In,the 
case of both the slave and the free worker, the parties may be said to have been 
coerced into performing the labor, or to have freely chosen the lesser evil (made 
a beneficial bargain, in effect, given the background set of alternatives). Either 
characterization is available. And that is the reason that some choices among evils 
can be characterized as voluntary decisions while other choices among evils can 
simultaneously be characterized as coerced. Where the line is drawn, from a 
logical standpoint, is arbitrary. One tradition of thought, for example, portrayed 
slavery in completely consensual terms, as an agreement in which the slave had 
voluntarily granted absolute control over himself to his master in exchange for 
his life. In fact, in certain areas at certain times, slavery and serfdom were 
formally initiated through agreements. (This was never a feature ofNew World 
slavery, however.) 
Needless to say, the choices presented in slavery are much harsher than the 
choices normally presented in free wage labor, and so we may rightly say that 
the degree of coercion in one form is normally much greater than in the other, 
but there are no logical grounds for saying that the pertormance of labor in one 
case is coerced, while in the other it is voluntary. As a matter of logic we have 
to say either that both are involuntary in different degrees, or that both involve 
the free choice of a lesser evil. 
Often in drawing the distinction between free and unfree labor it is tacitly 
conceded that there are elements of coercion involved even in free labor. The 
distinction then comes to tum on the different kinds of coercion involved in 
free vs. unfree labor. Unfree labor is coerced through the threat or actuality of 
"physical violence" (state authorized in most systems of unfree labor), or "legal 
compulsion" (state administered). Free labor is supposed to be coerced through 
"economic compulsion" (market based). 
27. Hale, "Force and the State", pp. 149-161, and Hale, Freedom Through Law, pp. 189-196. 
Much of the analysis in the following paragraphs derives from Hale's work. 
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Two implicit assumptions are made that justify the separation of labor coerc
in these different ways into the opposing categories free and unfree. First, t
different "types" of coercion are assumed to have fundamentally different sourc
and characteristics. The source of "legal" and in most systems of unfree lab
"physical" coercion is law. The forces of the market are supposed to be t
source of"economic" coercion, and they are supposed to operate impersonal
and indirectly. They "coerce" only in the way that nature may be said to coerc
if you do not work you starve, rather than in the way "law" coerces, personal
and directly. The forces of the market can be interfered with, but in so far 
they are left undisturbed, no one controls them, they work naturally. Law 
artificial, made and controlled by men. Second, the different types of coercio
are assumed to operate with radically different degrees of harshness. "Physica
violence and "legal" compulsion are viewed as much severer than "economi
coerciOn. 
This stark dichotomy, economic vs.legal coercion, which places labor subje
to one in one category and labor subject to the other in an opposite categor
operates to obscure the common sources and characteristics of the tw
"Economic" coercion always has its source in a set of legal rights, legal privileg
and legal powers, which place one person in a position to force another pers
to choose among disagreeable alternatives, just as "legal" compulsion and, 
most systems of coerced labor, "physical" compulsion do. Its exercize is al
quite personal and quite direct. 
Consider "economic" coercion in the bargaining relationship betwe
employers and employees. Robert Hale showed that law was the ultimate sour
of an employer's power to force a worker to choose among unpleasant altern
tives. His argument is worth quoting at length. 
The owner [of private property] can remove the legal duty under which the non­
owner labors [not to consume or otherwise use that property] . He can remove it, 
or keep it in force, at his discretion. To keep it in force may or may not have 
unpleasant consequences to the non-owner - consequences which spring from the 
law's creation of a legal duty. To avoid these consequences, the non-owner may 
be willing to obey the will of the owner, provided that the obedience is not in itself 
more unpleasant than the consequences to be avoided. Such obedience may take 
the trivial form of paying five cents for legal permission to eat a particular bag of 
peanuts, or it may take the more significant form of working for [a factory] owner 
at disagreeable toil for a slight wage. In either case the conduct is motivated [ ... ] 
by a desire to escape a more disagreeable alternative [ ... ] In the case of the labor what 
would be the consequence of refusal to comply with the owner's terms? It would 
be either absence of wages, or obedience to the terms of some other employer [ ... ] 
Suppose, now, the worker were to refuse to yield to the coercion of any employer, 
but were to choose instead to remain under the legal duty to abstain from the use 
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eating in the abstract, there is a law which forbids him to eat any of the food which 
actually exists in the community- and that law is the law of property. It can be 
lifted as to any specific food at the discretion of its owner, but if the owners 
unanimously refuse to lift the prohibition, the non-owner will starve unless he can 
himself produce food. And there is every likelihood that the owners will be 
unanimous in refusing, if he has no money[ ... ] Unless, then, the non-owner can 
produce his own food, the law compels him to starve if he has not wages, and 
compels him to go without wages unless he obeys the behests of some employer. 
It is the law that coerces him into wage-work under penalty of starvation - unless 
he can produce food. Can he? Here again there is no law to prevent the production 
of food in the abstract; but in every settled country there is a law which forbids him 
to cultivate any particular piece of ground unless he happens to be an owner. This 
again is the law of property. And this again will not be likely to be lifted unless he 
already has money. That way of escape from the law-made dilemma of starvation 
or obedience is closed to him[ ... ] In short, if he be not a property owner, the law 
which forbids him to produce with any of the existing equipment, and the law 
which forbids him to eat any of the existing food, will be lifted only in case he works 
for an employer. It is the law of property which coerces people into working for 
]28factory owners [... 
So-called "economic" coercion is an artifact of law, not of nature, and operates 
pe rsonally and directly on individuals. There is, however, a crucial respect in 
which it does differ from what we normally call "legal" compulsion. "Legal" 
or "physical" compulsion normally confronts an individual with a highly 
restricted set of unpleasant alternatives from which to choose. The choice, for 
example, might be between going to prison, becoming a fugitive from justice, 
or remaining at work. In most cases of"economic" coercion, the universe of 
alternatives is at least potentially much wider. A worker thinking about leaving 
his employer can try to find another job, apply for food stamps and Section 8 
housing, open a small business repairing cars in the back yard homestead in 
Alaska, move to Georgia where there are more jobs, emigrate to Australia, go 
back to school to retrain, join the army, move in with relatives, play guitar in 
the subway, and so forth. What is different about "economic" coercion is that 
it is often difficult to evaluate the universe of options which an individual faces. 
If most of the above options are unfeasible, as they often are, and the real choices 
are much narrower, remain at work, look for another job in the same line, go 
on welfare, become homeless, then the degree of coercion operating in this 
situation may even be greater than the degree of coercion operating when the 
threat is a mere fourteen day prison sentence. (Many nineteenth century English 
wage workers served such short term sentences.) On the other hand, if Australia 
is desperate for workers, is willing to subsidize passage over, provide housing, 
and guarantee a good paying job, and the unemployment rate in this country 
28. Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State", pp. 472-473. 
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is 2%, then the degree of coercion operating in this situation may be practically 
nonexistent. And so it is difficult to characterize this worker's situation in the 
abstract, because the feasibility and unpleasantness of all the potential options 
involves highly context specific information. It is hard even to compile a 
definitive list of what all the "real" options may or may not be. It is much easier 
to evaluate degrees of coercion when the alternatives confronting an individual 
are clearly defined and strictly circumscribed. This is why "economic" coercion 
is so slippery and contestable. 
But this difference does not make "economic" coercion "natural". The back­
ground conditions which constitute the options available to individuals and 
determine the degree of"economic" coercion operating in any situation are 
pervasively shaped by law.29 Whether welfure is a good, bad or impossible option 
depends upon welfure law, on eligibility rules and payment standards. Emigrating 
to Australia may be hard or easy depending upon Australian immigration rules. 
But it is only an option at all because American workers enjoy the background 
legal privilege of leaving the country whenever they wish to take up work 
elsewhere. Alaska may be a better or worse option depending upon whether 
the state government has a homestead program, but it is an option because 
Americans enjoy the legal privilege of settling in any state in the union they wish 
to. Playing guitar in the subway may be more or less feasible depending upon 
vagrancy rules and vagrancy rule enforcement. Another job may be a better or 
worse option depending upon how great the demand for labor is. But it is only 
because a worker possesses the background legal privilege of selling or withhold­
ing his labor in the first place, i.e. is not under a legal duty to work where an 
employer has need of labor (as in England under the Statute of Labourers, or 
as in slavery), that increased demand for labor can make this a better or worse 
option. If a preparatory course and a license are required in order to repair 
automobiles, or if nuisance law or zoning regulations prohibited it, opening a 
small shop in your yard might be less feasible or completely out of the question. 
How desperate workers as a group might be for work depends in good part on 
how widely property is distributed. But even this situation is conditioned to a 
great extent by a larger set of taken for granted background legal rules. Property 
is so unevenly distributed in the United States in good measure because inheri­
tance laws make it possible for accumulations of property to be preserved over 
generations, and so on. 30 
29. 	 Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!", pp. 330-334, and "The Role of Law 
in Economic Thought", pp. 965-967. 
30. 	 On the "artificial" or "positive" nature of the law of inheritance see, for example, Blackstone, 
Commentaries, II, pp. 10, 12: "The most universal and ef way, of abandoning property, 

is by the death of the occupant; when, both the actual possession and intention of keeping 

possession ceasing, the property, which is founded upon such possession and intention, ought 

fectual 
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In extreme cases, such as South Africa, where ruling elites adopted vagrancy 
legislation and legal restrictions on land ownership in an effort to drive Africans 
into wage labor, law conditioned (created) "economic" coercion may produce 
outcomes very similar to those achievable under regimes of direct "legal" 
compulsion like slavery.31 But in all market societies, an extensive set of back­
ground legal rules establish to a significant degree the real alternatives available 
to working people, and hence the extent of the so-called "economic" coercion 
they confront. In most market societies, these numerous background rules are 
not put in place for a single purpose or by a single group. Nevertheless, whatever 
the formal reasons for their adoption, they affect the universe of possibilities 
open to working people. And in many cases, at least certain of these r11les 
(welfare and vagrancy rules for example) are consciously adopted with an eye 
toward inducing laboring people to enter into or remain in wage work. 
Depending upon their precise details , the magnitude of " economic" co ercion 
facing ordinary people can be quite different in different free market societies. 
Legal rules governing bargaining behavior in the market also play a crucial 
role in the creation of so-called "economic" power.32 In free markets, the state 
must always make a detailed set of decisions about which bargaining tactics will 
be permitted and which kinds prohibited. It simply has no choice. The legal 
system will always be confronted with claims that one action or another of a 
bargaining party has injured the other party. If workers are given the privilege 
or right of freely combining to withhold their labor, employers may enjoy less 
coercive power in the relationship because workers have been given legal 
permission to damage them through certain forms of activity. If workers are 
permitted to mount secondary boycotts, employers may have less power still, 
because workers have been given legal permission to damage them in another 
way. If employers a_re prohibited from replacing workers who go out on strike, 
they may enjoy even less coercive power. If employers possess the legal privilege 
of combining to negotiate with workers, they may enjoy more power vis a vis 
their employees, and so forth ad infinitum. Change one or two rules and you 
may change the degree of coercion slightly. Change all the bargaining rules in 
favor of one party and you may change the degree of coercion radically. There 
are numerous possible ways free market bargaining relationships can be legally 
also to cease of course [ . . .  ] Wills therefore and testaments, rights of inheritance and succes­
sions, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects 
regu lated by them [ . . .  ]" See also Fri ed, Robert Hale and Progressive Legal Economics, p. 41: "The 
Supreme Court [ . . .  ] in its 1898 decision in Magoun v. Illinois Trust, [upheld] a progressive 
inheri tance tax against an equal protection claim, on the ground tha t as inheritance itself was 
a special privilege conferred by the state, the state was free to condition it as it saw fit." 
31. 	See Engerman, "Coerced and Free Labor". 
32. 	 The following paragraph draws heavily on Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and 
Foucault!", and "The Role of Law in Economic Thought". 
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constructed, all of them placing the parties in different positions to coerce one 
another. 
In an earlier section 01),  we looked at another set of legal rules that define 
another dimension of power in labor relationships, rules governing what contract 
remedies are available to the parties, and what remedies they may establish for 
themselves as part of their agreement. A nineteenth century American common 
law rule of contract provided that if a worker left his job before he had fulfilled 
his contractual term of service, he forfeited his legal claim to wages for the time 
he had already worked. 33 Where an employer had held back wages, such a rule 
forced a worker to choose between staying and forfeiting his accumulated wages. 
If he stayed because he simply could not afford to lose his back wages, the legal 
rule would have operated to coerce him into remaining in the same way a rule 
that forced him to choose between staying and serving fourteen days in prison 
would have. Is the compulsion of the American rule any less "legal" than the 
compulsion of the English rule of criminal sanctions? 
So-called "economic" coercion, the coercion of the market, is not like the 
coercion of nature , impersonal and indirect, in numerous different ways it is a 
product of law, just as so-called "legal" coercion is. Thus, the effort to separate 
labor into opposing types on the basis of a simple opposition between "eco­
nomic" and "legal" coercion does not hold up. When we examine the eco­
nomic/legal distinction carefully, it dissolves into a complex account of the 
numerous different ways in which coercion is constituted by law. 
The second assumption made about "economic" coercion that justifies placing 
labor coerced by the market into the category free, while labor coerced by "law" 
is designated unfree is that "economic" coercion is less harsh than other types 
of coercion. In the twentieth century, a kind of implicit scale of coercion has 
been developed arranged abstractly by "types", with "economic" coercion 
placed at one end as mild, and "legal" and "physical" coercion at the other as 
severe. American law certainly seems to be based on this kind of abstract scale. 
But doesn't the coerciveness of all "types" of coercion depend upon particular 
circumstances? Can't economic coercion sometimes be more coercive than legal 
coe;-cion? Depending upon the precise circumstances, for example, imprison­
ment may or may not be more coercive than so-called "economic" threats. The 
threat of starvation may certainly operate more powerfully than a short prison 
term. 19th century English wage workers sometimes expressed a preference for 
a short prison term rather than forego the opportunity to obtain higher wages 
by changing employers. And who is to say that a fourteen day prison term is 
invariably a more disagreeable alternative than losing one's life savings, or home. 
33. 	 Nearly all states adhered to this rule during the first half of the nineteenth century. See Holt, 
"Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States", and "Recovery by the Worker Who Quits"; 
see also Karsten, '"B ottomed onjustice"'. 
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It is clear that there are numerous degrees of "legal" coercion just as there are 
numerous degrees of " economic" coercion. It is more accurate to think of the 
two in terms of two parallel scales, or a combined scale, in which both run from 
very severe to rather mild, rather than in terms of a single scale arranged by 
abstract "types". In characterizing labor relations in terms of a continuum, 
however, we don't mean to imply that there have not been real differences in 
these forms of coercion. Dramatic differences have existed and these have been 
the basis for profound political and social disagreements and occasional violent 
conflict. 
Where does all this leave us. First, where the opposition free labor/ coerced labor 
is used, we have to see the line drawn between the two as arbitrary. One of our 
tasks should be to try to explain how such arbitrary lines came to be constructed, 
how certain forms of coercion were subdy legitimized by being sanctioned by 
law. The nineteenth century English, as we have said, considered their wage 
workers free for the most part. Twentieth century American lawyers and 
historians view the decision of a worker to remain in or return to a job because 
his employer threatened him with imprisonment as a coerced decision in which 
continued work is involuntary servitude. On the other hand, twentie th-century 
American lawyers and historians view the decision of a nineteenth-century 
worker to remain at a job because his employer threatened him with the loss 
of his back wages as a voluntary decision in which the continued work was 
consensual not coerced. 
Second, if the categories voluntary/coerced, free/unfree labor are, in certain 
important respects, empty conceptual shells, our task becomes to offer historical 
accounts oflabor relations in terms of specific coercive practices, all, in different 
ways, the product of law, rather than in terms of discontinous "types" of labor 
arranged under the categories free and coerced. These accounts should attempt 
to explain why a particular polity adopted the rules it did, why it granted to 
employers or workers particular legal rights, particular legal privileges, or 
imposed particular legal duties, because these rules determined which coercive 
devices the parties would have a right to, which would be legally tolerated and 
which would be prohibited - from among the rich variety of possibilities. 
Political and legal struggle between different groups over these rules must 
certainly be part of these explanations. These accounts should not only describe 
struggles over rules, but also struggles under rules. How individuals and groups 
defined and pursued their interests was also a function of the set of rules within 
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which they operated at any particular time. Change rules, and interests might 
well come to be redefined and pursued differently. 
In writing this kind of history, we have to reject the view that history unfolds 
in stages with each stage a functionally coherent whole composed of a fixed 
block of practices and institutions all required by the first principles of that form 
of social/ economic organization. Rather, the lesson to be learned from nine­
teenth century English wage labor is that the rules governing social/ economic 
life are established in ad hoc ways out of a variety of existing and new materials, 
and may be changed piecemeal, the outcomes depending on the relative political 
power of the participants, extant social views about permissible and impermissi­
ble forms of coercion, the normative persuasiveness of different groups, and a 
host of other factors. 
